摘要
基于贷款方式多样化的视角,以创业板上市公司2012—2015年数据为样本,使用普通最小二乘法和倾向得分匹配法研究CEO政治关联是否会增加企业银行贷款所带来的财务风险。研究发现:数量越多、期限越长的银行贷款会给企业带来越大的财务风险,CEO政治关联会强化这一财务风险,途径之一在于CEO政治关联的企业会倾向于选择单一的贷款方式,进而获取数量更多的银行贷款增加财务风险。并且,CEO政治关联的企业并不倾向于选择三大贷款方式,而是专注于除三种贷款方式之外的一些授信项。研究结论证实CEO政治关联会增加银行贷款的财务风险。
The loans effect of political connection has drawn wide attention from academia. Based on the perspective of loans diversity and the data of companies in DEM from 2012 to 2015, we use OLS and PSM to analyze the relationship between CEO＇s political connection and financial risk of bank loans. We find that the bigger the amount, the longer the term of bank loans, and the greater financial risk companies have. CEO＇s political connection can increase financial risk by tending to choose loans method which lacks diversity for the companies with political connection so that attaining a bigger amount of bank loan increases financial risk. Besides, CEO＇s political connection prefers to choose some credits other than the three major lending options. The research conclusions confirm that CEO＇s political connection will increase financial risk of bank loans.
作者
乐菲菲
张金涛
YUE Feifei;ZHANG Jintao(School of Business, Jinan University, Jinan 250002, Chin)
出处
《中南大学学报（社会科学版）》
CSSCI
北大核心
2018年第2期109-116,共8页
Journal of Central South University：Social Sciences
基金
山东省社会科学规划项目"交互作用下的山东省上市公司资本结构与绩效研究--基于公司治理的视角"(11CJJZ14)
山东省社会科学规划项目"内幕交易行为影响因素
优化识别与协同治理研究"(14CWYJ01)
济南大学博士基金"联立方程模型在资本结构与绩效相关性的应用研究"(160100108)
