财政分权、金融抑制与资源配置效率——兼论资源软约束下的产能过剩形成

Fiscal Decentralization, Financial Repression and Resource Allocation Efficiency——Concurrent Research on the Formation of Overcapacity under Soft Constraints of Resource

作为"博弈的规则",制度是重要的,但不同类型的制度却可以使行为者为善,亦可使其为恶。通过理论推演和经验验证来探究财政分权和金融抑制的制度环境对不同行为主体行为选择的影响,以及扭曲激励下所带来的资源配置效率问题。基于制度经济学"制度—行为—绩效"的研究范式形成的一个经济逻辑是:财政分权→激励扭曲:GDP竞赛(保增长)→打破预算约束→金融抑制→国有企业资源软约束→投资冲动→杠杆高企→信贷效率下降→债务违约和借新还旧→经济金融风险积聚。在形成投资驱动经济增长的制度环境下,信息不对称和激励不相容将激励理性个体自利行为的最大化,扭曲资源配置的方向和效率,造成经济增长放缓和转型困难加大的现实两难问题。因此,建议通过经济体制机制的深化改革和有效制度的供给来纠正金融等要素资源扭曲配置,激励生产性活动增加和有效投资增长,实现潜在增长率的提升。

As game theory or rule of game, institution is of great importance. However, different types of institutions could lead the agent to act in a virtuous or a selfish way. Through theoretical deduction and empirical verification, this paper explored how institutional environment of financial decentralization and financial repression effect on the action choice of different agents, and had a research on the issue of resource allocation efficiency under incentive mechanism. This paper put forward an economic logic based on the paradigm of Institutions-Conduct（personal choice）-Performance： fiscaldecentralization →incentive distortion： GDP competition（maintain growth）→break budget constraint →financialrepression →soft resource constraint of state-owned enterprises →investmentimpulsion→highleverage→decline of credit efficiency→debt default and ＂borrowing for repaying＂→accumulation of economic and financial risk. In the institutional environment of investment-driven economic growth, information asymmetry and incentive incompatibility will stimulate the rational individuals to act for maximization of self-interest, thus will twist the direction and reduce the efficiency of resource allocation, and lead to the dilemma of economic growth and transformation. Finally,the paper suggest that through deepening reform of economic system and providing effective institution would be needed in the coming years.