期刊文献+

基于带宽优化分配和Shapley值的网络收益

Network income based on optimal bandwidth allocation and Shapley value
下载PDF
导出
摘要 针对多域联盟网络中的带宽分配和收益问题,提出了一种基于带宽优化分配的收益最大化算法和基于Shapley值激励的收益分享机制.利用在端到端的Qo S约束条件下与每个管道s相关联的效用函数Us(as),结合Qo S约束条件下的带宽分配模型,应用于多域网络联盟的带宽拍卖,从而实现联盟的收益最大化.将联盟博弈理论和Shapley值用于联盟收益分享,根据在全部AS之间按Shapley值的比例进行分享的机制来激励联盟中的ASs,从而为整个联盟提供更多容量.结果表明,提出的带宽优化分配算法和收益分享机制既能使整个联盟收益最大化,又能增加整个联盟的收益和其自身的收益分享. Aiming at the problem of bandwidth allocation and income in multi-domain coalition networks,an income sharing mechanism based on the income maximization algorithm for optimal bandwidth allocation and Shapley value incenting was proposed. With the utility function Us( as) associated with each pipe s under the end-to-end Qo S constraints,the bandwidth allocation model combined with the Qo S constraints was applied to the bandwidth auction in the multi-domain network alliance so as to achieve the maximum income of alliance. In addition,the coalitional game theory and the Shapley value were applied to the alliance income sharing. According to the sharing mechanism with the proportion of Shapley value among all AS,the ASs in the coalition were encouraged to provide more capacity for the entire alliance. The results showthat the proposed optimal bandwidth allocation algorithm and income sharing mechanism can not only ensure the income maximization of whole alliance,but also increase the income of whole alliance and its own income sharing.
作者 石峰 吴艳平 SHI Feng;WU Yan-ping(Computing Center, Taiyuan University, Taiyuan 030032, China;Information Technology Branch, Changchun Vocational Institute of Technology, Changchun 130033, China)
出处 《沈阳工业大学学报》 EI CAS 北大核心 2018年第3期310-315,共6页 Journal of Shenyang University of Technology
基金 河南省科技厅计划项目(2015002763)
关键词 网络 多域联盟 带宽拍卖 效用函数 QOS约束 收益最大化 SHAPLEY值 收益分享 network multi-domain alliance bandwidth auction utility function QoS constraint income maximization Shapley value income sharing
  • 相关文献

参考文献6

二级参考文献71

  • 1陶军,吴清亮,吴强.基于非合作竞价博弈的网络资源分配算法的应用研究[J].电子学报,2006,34(2):241-246. 被引量:19
  • 2Yang S,Hajek B.VCG-Kelly mechanisms for divisible goods:adapting VCG mechanisms to one-dimensional signals[J].IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications,2007,25(6):1237-1243.
  • 3Lazar A A,Semre N.Design and Analysis of the Progressive Second Price Auction for Network Bandwidth Sharing .http://eprints.kfupm.edu.sa/34183/,2008-09-01.
  • 4Shu J,Varaiya P.Smart pay access control via inventive alignment[J].Journal on Selected Areas in Communications,2006,24(5):1051-1060.
  • 5Johari R,Tsitsiklis J N.Communication requirements of VCG-like mechanisms in convex environments .Proceeding of Allerton Conference on Communications,Control and Computing .Illinois:Curran Associates,Inc,2005.560-569.
  • 6Tuffin B,Maille P.How many parallel TCP sessions to open:a pricing perspective .Lecture Notes on Computer Sciences .Berlin:Springer Press,2006.2-12.
  • 7Xing Y P,Chandramouli R.Stochastic learning solution for distributed discrete power control game in wireless data networks[J].IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking,2008,16(4):932-944.
  • 8ADAR E, HUBERMAN B A. Free Riding on Gnutella[R]. Xerox PARC, 2000.
  • 9HARDIN G. The tragedy of the commons[J]. Science, 1968, 162 (3859): 1243-1248.
  • 10RICHARD T B M, SAM C M L, JOHN C S L. Incentive and service differentiation in P2P networks: a game theroretic approcach[J]. IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking, 2006, 14(5): 978-991.

共引文献36

相关作者

内容加载中请稍等...

相关机构

内容加载中请稍等...

相关主题

内容加载中请稍等...

浏览历史

内容加载中请稍等...
;
使用帮助 返回顶部