PPP项目再审核与动态绩效激励机制

The Dynamic Performance Incentive Mechanism and Re-examination of PPP Project

本文探讨了基于政府角度和针对PPP项目社会资本方的动态绩效激励机制,运用委托代理理论构建PPP项目绩效激励模型,包括静态绩效激励模型和融入阶段性再审核的动态绩效激励模型。同时,围绕社会资本方最优努力水平、政府效益最优化等方面进行了分析,并以奖罚系数为例,讨论了政府的社会、经济、综合效益的影响因素并提出了奖罚系数调整范围及优化建议。最后通过案例展开数值性分析,展示了融入再审核的动态绩效激励机制能够实现综合效益的最大化。本文的研究结果旨在为政府科学确定PPP项目运营阶段的绩效激励机制及再审核周期提供理论依据和决策支持。

The paper explores the dynamic performance drive mechanism for the private sector of the Public-PrivatePartnership（PPP）project from the government perspective,and constructs the performance incentive model by applying the principal-agent theory,including the static performance incentive model and the dynamic performance incentive model incorporated with multiple stage re-examination.Meanwhile,the analyses around the optimal effort level of private sector,the maximization of government benefit,period of re-examination as well as adjustment of the incentive parameters are carried out.Take coefficient of rewards-punishment for example,thus explaining influential factors to the social,economic and comprehensive benefits of the government and proposing optimization suggestions for the coefficient range of rewards-punishment.The numerical analyses based on a case illustrates that dynamic performance incentive model incorporated with re-examination is able to achieve maximization of the comprehensive benefit.The study aims to provide the government sector with the theoretical foundation and support when making decisions on the performance incentive mechanism and period of re-examination during the operation of the PPP project.