商业银行高管薪酬、风险承担水平与银行绩效——基于信贷集中度与损失类贷款研究

Executive Compensation,Risk-taking Level and Performance of Commercial Banks——A Study Based on Loan Concentration and Loss Loan

文章采用2009-2015年中国A股上市商业银行的数据,基于高管权力理论和委托代理理论,对我国商业银行高管薪酬、风险承担水平和银行绩效之间的关系进行了实证分析,并通过关注前十大贷款集中度和损失类贷款来研究高管薪酬对银行绩效的影响。实证研究发现,商业银行的高管薪酬与银行风险承担水平及银行业绩呈负相关关系,这一结果说明过高的商业银行高管薪酬不仅降低了银行绩效,而且也加大了银行的风险。进一步的实证结果发现,商业银行高管薪酬的增加会使商业银行信贷集中度和损失类贷款增加,进而直接影响银行业绩。

This paper, using the dala of Chinese A-share listed commercial banks from 2009 to 2015, based on the theory of ex- ecutive power and the theory, of principal-agent, makes an empirical analysis of the relationship betwcc, executive compensation, risk-taking level and perfnrmanee in Chinese commercial banks, and studies the impact of executive compensation on bank performance by focusing on the top ten loan concentration and loss loan. The empirical study finds that the executive compensation of commercial banks has a negative correlation with bank risk-taking level and bank performance, which shows that the excessive excuutive compensation of connnercial banks not only reduces the bank performance, but also increases the bank risk. The further empirical results show that the increase of executive compensation of commercial banks increases the loan concentration and the loss loan, and then directly affects the bank perfonnance.