非对称双零售商供应链的销售与回收渠道策略研究

Marketing and Recycling Channel Strategies in Supply Chains with Asymmetric Double Retailers

文章针对由两个具有竞争关系的非对称零售商和一个再制造商构成的闭环供应链,探索了再制造商是否选择回收再制造废旧产品以及以何种渠道回收再制造的问题。对不回收废旧产品、再制造商直接回收、委托较大的零售商回收以及委托较小的零售商回收这四种情形分别建立了模型,利用博弈论的方法分别求出了各种情形下制造商批发价、零售商零售价、委托回收价以及废旧产品回收价等供应链决策的最优解,并比较了各种情形的回收效益。研究发现:当消费者的环保意识较高时,制造商自己回收的效率最高,利润也最大;当消费者环保意识较低时,制造商会选择委托较大的零售商回收或放弃对废旧产品的回收。

This paper, in view of a closed-loop supply chain with two competitive asymmetric retailers and a remamufactnrer, explores whether the remanufacturer chooses to recycle and remanufacture waste products, and which channel the remanufacturer chooses. The paper builds a model for the four cases respectively, which are no recycling, remanufacture recycling directly, re- cycling through retailers with higher market shares and recycling through retailers with smaller market shares. The paper gains the optimal solutions of supply chain decision in various cases by applying the game theory, including wholesale prices of manu- facturer, retail prices, entrustment recycling prices and recycling prices of waste products, etc. , and compares the recycling prof- its in all cases. The study finds that： When the environmental protection awareness of consumers is high, the manufacturers are most likely to do recycling work by themselves, and gain the high profits; Whereas when the environmental protection awareness of consumers is low, the manufacturers may choose to entrust larger retailers to recycle or abandon the recycling of waste products.