证据是心理状态吗?

Does Evidence Consist of Mental States?

证据是哲学研究中的一个基本概念。以往对证据的讨论大多聚焦于证据的认识论作用,例如证据如何为确立信念、假说和理论提供支撑,而对证据本性的探讨(证据究竟是什么?什么类型的事物能成为证据?)只是在近年来才逐渐受到重视。证据的心理主义是近来引起较多关注的一种关于证据本性的学说,主张证据是内在于认知主体的某些特定心理状态,尤其是感知觉经验。文章剖析了证据心理主义的立论和主要依据,指出用以支持心理主义的几个主要理由并不成立,而在更一般的意义上,心理主义缺乏成为一个全面的关于证据本性的哲学学说的必要资源。

Evidence is one of the basic concepts of philosophy. However,most discussions were focused on the epistemic role of evidence. For example,how evidence support a belief or confirm a hypothesis. The nature of evidence（ what is evidence？ What kinds of thing count as evidence？） has been more or less neglected. The circumstance has now changed,more and more philosophers are now interested on the nature of evidence. Psychologism is one of the most influential theory,it claims that evidence consists of non-factive mental states which are internal of mind,such as perceptual experience. This paper explores the main characters of Psychologism and the reason for it. The conclusion is negative. Psychologism has been under fierce attack and is hard to defend. Broadly speaking,Psychologism has not the resources of becoming a full-fledged theory of the nature of evidence.