摘要
2013年底中组部关于严格限制官员背景人士出任独立董事相关规定的颁布,促使我国上市公司出现了官员背景独立董事辞职潮,学术界对于官员背景独立董事在发挥一般独立董事监督和咨询职能之外,是否以及如何发挥资源获取作用上并无明确结论。根据2010年至2013年沪深两市A股上市公司的平衡面板数据,从税收优惠、政府补贴和银行贷款三个路径探讨了官员背景独立董事的资源获取作用。研究发现官员背景独立董事能够降低公司的实际税率和银行贷款成本,提高公司获得的政府补贴。研究结果给出了官员独立董事发挥资源获取作用的具体路径,进一步发展了政治关联和独立董事的相关理论。同时研究结论也是对"禁官令"的解读,肯定了对这类独立董事进行限制的必要性,为建立新型政商关系提供了一定的理论参考和实践指导。
After the Organization Department of the Central Committee of CPC issued files to strictly limit people with official background to be independent directors in late 2013,there has been a wave of resignations of independent directors with official background in listed companies. Independent directors with official background became a short-lived blooming epiphyllum in Chinese corporate governance history.There is no definite conclusion about whether and how the independent directors with official background play the role of resource acquisition except the role of general supervision and advisory. Using the balanced panel data of A share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2010 to 2013,this paper explores the role of independent directors with official background in resource acquisition from three perspectives,i. e,tax incentives,government subsidies and bank loans by using multiple regression analysis.The results show that the independent directors with official background can reduce the company’s actual tax rate and the cost of bank loans,and increase the government subsidies. The results of this paper clearly point out the specific path through which the independent directors with official background play a role of resources acquisition,open the " black box" and further deepen related theories between political connections and the independent directors. Meanwhile,the conclusion of this paper is the interpretation of the government regulation,likewise affirms the necessity of restriction as well as provides a certain theoretical reference and practical guidance for the establishment of new political and business relations.
作者
郝臣
崔光耀
HAO Chen;CUI Guang-yao(China Academy of Corporate Governance of Nankai University,Tianjin 300071;Business School of Nankai University,Tianjin 300071)
出处
《兰州财经大学学报》
2018年第2期1-14,共14页
Journal of Lanzhou University of Finance and Economics
基金
教育部人文社会科学重点研究基地重大项目"公司治理转型测度与治理能力提升"(16JJD630002)
关键词
政治关联
官员
独立董事
税收优惠
政府补贴
银行贷款
political connections
officials
independent directors
tax incentives
government subsidies
bank loans