基础产品免费策略下新产品进入最优定价研究

Optimal pricing strategy for new entrants with free base products

针对具有正网络外部性的信息产品,在基础产品免费策略下,构建新产品与市场中已有产品的Stackelberg博弈模型.考虑网络外部性和转移成本对新产品进入策略的影响,进而研究市场先进入者和后进入者的最优定价策略,并对市场均衡结果进行分析.研究发现:在市场达到均衡时,市场先进入者可以通过降低附加产品价格来竞争市场份额;只有当网络外部性强度和转移成本都较小时,后进入者才会采取基础产品免费的进入策略;当网络外部性强度或转移成本较大时,后进入者或者不进入市场,或者进入市场但不提供免费的基础产品.

For information goods with positive network externalities, a Stackelberg model involving an incumbent and an entrant is developed when the base product is free. Considering the impacts of network externalities and switching cost on new product entry, this paper investigates optimal pricing strategies for the incumbent and the entrant, and analyzes the market equilibrium. Results show that the incumbent can lower the optimal price to extend the market share in the market equilibrium. Only when network intensity is weak and switching cost is small, would the entrant enter the market with the free base product. However, if network intensity is too strong or switching cost is too large, the entrant would not enter the market with the free strategy. Instead,the entrant would provide a product to be paid by consumers, or not enter the market at all.