网络交易标价错误的经济分析

An Economic Analysis of Mispricing of Online Seller

错标低价的交易能够导致社会损失。禁止走出错误,可能激励部分买方利用卖方的错误占便宜,卖方过度预防,军备竞赛,加剧社会损失。允许走出错误,则有助于为买卖双方提供正确激励,优化行为,最小化社会损失。后者又有"合同未成立"与"重大误解"两种法律技术选择。对于未确认发货的交易,"合同未成立"是比"重大误解"成本更小化的法律方案。而对于已确认发货的,否认构成"重大误解",将错就错,让损失留在原地,则通常是成本更小化的选择。以上方案,有助于达成错价交易损失、预防成本及司法成本三者之和,也就是社会总成本的最小化。其不仅在后果上有效率,法律技术上可行;且不违背公平原则,甚至比其他方案更为公平。

Mispricing - trade can make social losses. Forbidden to cancel the order, the buyer will make over - search and the seller will make over - precaution. The arms race will exacerbate social losses. Allowing to cancel the order, it helps to provide the good incentives for both buyers and sellers, optimize behavior, and minimize social losses. There are two legal solutions , ＂no contract＂ and ＂significant mistake＂：, which can be used to cancel the deal. In the case of unfilled orders, the ＂no contract＂ is the less cosily legal solution than the ＂significant mistake＂. If the delivery has been con- firmed, to deny ＂significant mistake＂ and let the losses lie where they fall would be the less costly solution. The above choice will help to minimize the sum of mispricing - trade losses, precaution costs and judicial costs. It is not only efficient in consequence and workable in legal solution, but also fair, even fairer than other solutions.