摘要
孟子既以心有"四端"论性善,又由"心之官则思"确证人之道德主体性。几位现代新儒家学者均注重从道德主体性的层次诠释孟子性善论,因惟其如此始能超越其他人性观点而决定性地证成性善。但他们又必须顾及四端之说,因此赋予四端种种它们并不必然具有的特质和意义,以使之足以担当道德主体性之位。理解孟子性善论需要处理好"四端"同"心之官则思"二说之间的关系。
Mencius not only interpreted his view on the original goodness of human nature from the fact that there were four terminals in the human heart but also confirmed the moral subjectivity of human beings based on the idea that "the function of the human heart is meditation. "Several modern neo-Confucian scholars have paid attention to their interpretation of Mencius' s view on the goodness of human nature from the level of moral subjectivity,and it is only in this way can it transcend other views on human nature and conclusively justify the goodness of human nature. However,they must also take into account the four-terminal view,and thus endow them with qualities and meanings not necessarily possessed,so that they can fully assume the position of moral subjectivity. It is essential to clarify the relationship between the four-terminal idea and the idea of meditation-as-the-function-of the heart in the interpretation of Mencius' s view on the goodness of human nature.
作者
王觅泉
WANG Mi-quan(School of Marxism,China University of Political Science and Law,Beijing 100088,China)
出处
《海南师范大学学报(社会科学版)》
2018年第2期102-108,共7页
Journal of Hainan Normal University(Social Sciences)
基金
嵩阳书院2016年度专项"儒家道德心理学研究"
北京高校中国特色社会主义理论研究协同创新中心(中国政法大学)委托项目(项目编号:2016KY-09)阶段性成果
关键词
性善
四端
心之官则思
道德主体性
the original goodness of human nature
four terminals
meditation as the function of the human heart
moral subjectivity