“所有制歧视”VS“规模歧视”:谁对企业全要素生产率的危害更大——基于地区信贷腐败的视角

Ownership Discrimination vs Scale Discrimination: Who is more Hazardous to Enterprises' TFP——From the Perspective of Regional Credit Corruption

以国有银行为主导的银行业体系背景下,中国企业在银行信贷过程中往往遭遇"所有制歧视"或者"规模歧视",从而导致企业在申请贷款时需要向银行工作人员支付非正式费用才能获得信贷资源,产生银行信贷腐败。本文利用世界银行2005年对中国的投资环境调查数据与2004—2007年中国工业企业数据库的微观数据,实证分析了地区信贷腐败对企业全要素生产率(TFP)的影响。研究发现,地区信贷腐败与企业TFP呈现"倒U"型关系。进一步的模拟分析表明,单独消除"规模歧视"能够给企业TFP带来较大提升;而单独消除"所有制歧视",尽管会降低企业参与银行信贷腐败的概率,但却给企业整体TFP带来较小的负面影响。只有同时消除"所有制歧视"与"规模歧视",才能既促进企业整体TFP水平的提升,又降低企业参与银行信贷腐败的概率。这一结果表明,"规模歧视"对企业TFP的危害更大。

Chinese enterprises often encounter ownership discrimination or scale discrimination in the process of obtaining bank credits. As a result,enterprises may pay informal fees to bank workers when they apply for loans to obtain credit resources,and thus there may be an occurrence of credit corruption. Based on the World Bank's Investment Climate Survey in China( 2005) and firm-level data for the period 2004-2007 conducted by the National Bureau of Statistics,this paper analyzes the impact of regional credit corruption on enterprises' total factor productivity( TFP). The study finds that there is an "inverted U"type relationship between the regional credit corruptionand enterprises' TFP. Further simulation analysis shows that eliminating scale discrimination alone can bring about a significant increase for enterprises' TFP. However,eliminating ownership discrimination alone will bring overall negative impact on enterprises' TFP. Only by eliminating ownership discrimination and scale discrimination simultaneously can not only promote the overall enterprises' TFP,but also reduce the probability of enterprises participating in credit corruption.