家族控股股东的侵占路径和上市公司利益的保护机制

Exploitation Mechanisms of Family Controlling Shareholders and Protection Mechanisms of Publicly Listed Companies' Interests

两权分离是否带来控股股东侵占中小股东利益?本文在第二代理问题基础上提出并验证了"家族转移假说",分析了财富转移的具体手法,讨论保护中小股东的基本机制。使用1344家上市公司的长期绩效数据,我们发现,家族控股公司的两权分离引致了我国上市公司中的利益侵占,显著降低了IPO长期回报率。分析利益侵占的具体机制,本文发现,随着两权分离程度的加大,家族控股股东占用上市公司资金比例提高,资本支出降低,股利分配减少,关联交易增多。经理层激励和股东监督能够约束大股东利益侵占,但是,保护中小股东的根本举措在于改善股权结构和提高法治水平。

Does the separation of the rights of control and cash flow allow the majority shareholder to exploit the rest？ With the long-term performance data of Chinese companies publicly listed in Shanghai or Shenzhen Stock Exchanges, we find that the separation of ownership and control in family-controlled firms can bring about the tunneling problem and significantly decrease the long-term return. Specifically speaking, with the growing magnitude of separation, the family controlling shareholder tends to occupy more capital, decrease capital expenditures, reduce cash dividends, and enlarge related party transitions. We further find that ameliorating the shareholding structures and abating information asymmetry can refrain the family controlling shareholder from exploitating corporate wealth.