家族控制权会加剧企业资金期限结构错配吗?——来自中国非国有上市公司的经验证据

Does Family Control Right Exacerbate the Mismatch of Capital Maturity Structure? Evidence from Non-state-owned Listed Firms in China

家族控制权体现为"监督效应"还是"侵占效应",一直以来是学术研究的焦点。家族控制权对企业资金期限结构错配的影响机理如何?研究发现,家族控制权越强,企业资金期限结构错配越严重,且主要是家族控制权存在的较高利益侵占动机所致。深入研究发现,对于融资约束企业,家族控制权对企业资金期限结构错配的影响更强,而且家族控制权会导致债务期限结构缩短,表明银行等债权人通过短期借款的方式加强治理效应,进一步支持了家族控制权的"侵占效应"。此外,家族控制权越强,资金期限结构错配造成的企业风险越大。研究表明,家族控制权存在的侵占动机很可能通过资金期限结构错配的途径加剧企业风险,研究发现对于加强中国家族企业公司治理、维护实体经济发展具有一定借鉴意义。

Whether the monitoring effect or the entrenchment effect plays a dominant role in the governance of family firms is a hot topic. This study investigates the impacts of family control right on the mismatch of capital maturity structure. We find the positive relation between family control right and the mismatch of capital maturity structure,resulting from the entrenchment effect of family control right. Further study shows that the above positive relation is much higher for firms with financial constraints,and family control right is negatively related to debt maturity,indicating that creditors,including banks,take advantage of short-term loan to strengthen the governance effects. Moreover,evidence shows that the mismatch of capital maturity structure will cause higher operating risks,as the family control right increases. Our study suggests that the entrenchment effect of family control right increase operating risks through the capital maturity mismatch. The findings contribute to the governance of family firms and the development of real economy.