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集团控制、并购与上市公司现金持有 被引量:6

Group Control,M&A and Cash Holdings of the Listed Companies
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摘要 采用2007-2014年我国沪深A股上市公司数据,实证检验并购战略对企业现金持有的影响,并进一步基于融资约束与代理冲突两个维度,考察企业集团经营对上述两者之间关系的调节作用。研究发现:(1)企业会因并购战略持有更多现金,相对于独立企业,集团控制负向调节企业并购战略与现金持有水平之间的关系,且这种负向调节效应在非国有企业中更加突出,表明集团经营有助于缓解成员企业的融资约束;(2)集团代理冲突问题会影响集团控制缓解成员企业融资约束功能的发挥,在第二类代理冲突较小的企业中,集团控制对企业并购战略与现金持有水平关系的负向调节效应更强,且企业大股东持股比率越高,集团控制的这种效应越明显。研究揭示了集团控制对并购与企业现金持有关系影响的机理与路径,并从代理冲突与缓解融资约束相互作用的视角提供了影响公司并购决策的新证据,从而为改进公司治理与提升现金持有决策质量提供了具有实践指导意义的思路。 This paper adopts the data of listed companies of Shanghai and Shenzhen stock market from 2007 to 2014 in China,to empirically test the impact of MA strategy on corporate cash holdings,and further explore the moderating role of group operation based on the two dimensions of financing constraints and agency conflicts. We find that:first,companies would hold more cash for acquisitions strategy. Compared with the independent firms,group-controlled firms would be helpful to reduce the member enterprises cash holdings,which is especially obvious in non-state-owned enterprises. This indicates that the group management helps to ease the financing constraints of member enterprises,showing a mitigation effect of financing constraints. Second,the group agency conflict will affect the role played by the group in alleviating the financing constraint of the member enterprises. For firms with smaller second type of agency conflict,group-controlled has a stronger effect in reducing member firms' cash holdings for MA. As the proportion of the largest shareholders increases,the significant effect of group in reducing the cash holdings of the member enterprises also increases. This paper reveals the mechanism and path of group control on the relationship between MA and cash holdings,and provides new evidence for MA decisions from the perspective of the interaction between agency conflict and mitigation of financing constraints. Finally,this study provides a practical guiding significance of the idea for improving corporate governance and enhancing the quality of cash holdings decision-making.
作者 徐虹 李敏 芮晨 Hong Xu;Min Li;and Chert Rui(School of Business, Anhui University of Technology, Ma'anshan Anhui 243032, China;Ma'anshan Agricultural Development Bank, Ma'anshan Anhui 243000, China)
出处 《会计与经济研究》 CSSCI 北大核心 2018年第2期58-74,共17页 Accounting and Economics Research
基金 国家自然科学基金项目(71372204)
关键词 并购 集团控制 现金持有 融资约束 代理冲突 M&A group control cash holdings financing constraint agency conflict
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