摘要
国有企业混合所有制改革在本质上是单一所有制向混合所有制的制度变迁过程,而制度变迁中的有限理性与路径依赖性决定了混合所有制并不完全,致使基于正式契约的混合所有制治理体系同样会产生效率损失。为此,本文在分析混合所有制制度变迁的低效率路径依赖与效率损失基础上,引入重复博弈与关系契约的研究视角,通过对混合所有制的关系契约治理结构选择以及自动履约机制构建,提出国有企业发展混合所有制的关系契约治理思路及相应举措。
The nature of the mixed ownership in state owned enterprises is the institutional changing process from the sole ownership to the mixed ownership.However,due to the existence of the limited rational reality,the design and the execution of the formal mixed-ownership contract is incomplete.Therefore,the governance system based on the formal mixed-ownership contract will inevitably produce efficiency loss based on mixed ownership.This article,from the informal contract point of view,Through the selection of the mixed ownership relationship contract governance structure of the development of state-owned enterprises as well as the construction of the automatic performance mechanism of the mix-owned contrast based on the reputation mechanism and trust mechanism,it then proposes the ideas and measures of the mixed relational contracts governance of the state-owned enterprises.
出处
《福建师范大学学报(哲学社会科学版)》
CSSCI
北大核心
2018年第3期14-23,30,共11页
Journal of Fujian Normal University:Philosophy and Social Sciences Edition
基金
吉林财经大学新入职博士科研启动项目"混合所有制契约关系与治理问题研究"(2017BZ009)
教育部人文社科重点研究基地重大项目"中国国有企业发展混合所有制研究"(16JJD790020)的阶段性成果