国有资本经营预算制度、管理层激励与企业价值创造

State-owned Capital Operating Budget System, Management Incentive and Enterprise Value Creation

针对国有资本经营与收益水平低的效率问题，本文以国有资本经营预算制度的实施为背景，基于2003—2016年A股央企上市公司数据，实证研究了国有资本经营预算制度、管理层激励与企业价值创造三者之间的关系。研究发现：国有资本经营预算制度的实施有助于央企实现企业价值创造，管理层激励能增强这一正向影响；现行的国有资本收益上缴比例对央企的企业价值创造能力产生负向影响，管理层激励能改善这一负向影响。

In the view of efficiency problems of the state-owned capital operation and lower income, we take the implementation of state-owned capital operating budget system as the research background. Based on the data of A-share listed central enterprises from 2003 to 2016, we empirically study the relationship among the state-owned capital operating budget system, management incen- tives and enterprise value creation. The results show that the implementation of the state-owned capital operating budget system con- tribute to central enterprise to realize the enterprise value creation, where management incentive has a positive reinforcement. In con- trast, current state-owned capital return ratio has a negative impact on central enterprise value creation, but management incentive can improves this negative impact.