摘要
自经济资本激励在"双一流"政策的推动下建构了我国大学高层次人才竞争的实践范式后便备受质疑。然而,伴随着世界学术体制的转型,经济资本激励在与现代科学的嵌套中进入大学高层次人才竞争的中心,并在我国人事管理制度从单位制向聘任制的制度变迁中得以制度化。国家人才发展政策对经济资本激励的强化、"学习者"大学利用经济资本激励规避竞争短板、高层次人才自我实现的需要奠定了这一行动范式的现实基础。诚然,经济资本激励并不完美,具有使高层次人才成为符码化存在、减损大学高层次人才竞争意涵的缺陷。但在运用经济资本激励竞争高层次人才已成为世界各个国家的大学走向一流过程中无法逃避的话题的国际语境中,经济资本激励在未来将继续框定我国大学高层次人才竞争的实践。因此,探究防范经济资本激励缺陷的运作机制与制度规范,应成为今后努力的方向。
The economic capital incentive has been questioned ever since it constructed the practice paradigm of high-level talents competition under the double first-class policy. However, with the transformation of the academic system in the world, economic capital incentive nested with modern science has entered the center of high-level talents competition. In the while, it has been institutionalized in the personnel management system transformation from a system to an employment system in China. The national talent development policy lays the action paradigm foundation for strengthening the economic capital incentive, learner-universities using economic capital incentive to avoid competitive weaknesses and the needs of high-level talents to achieve self-realization. It is true that economic capital incentive is not perfect, and has defects of making high-level talents becoming symbolic existence and damaging the significance of high-level talents competition. However, under the international topic context where using economic capital to motivate high-level talents competition has been an unavoidable topic in the process entering first class colleges and universities, economic capital incentive will continue to frame the practice of high-level talents competition in China. Therefore, exploring the operating mechanism and institutional norms of circumventing economic capital incentive defects should be the direction of future efforts.
出处
《国家教育行政学院学报》
CSSCI
北大核心
2018年第5期24-31,共8页
Journal of National Academy of Education Administration
基金
教育部人文社会科学研究青年项目(15YJCZH191)
关键词
高层次人才竞争
经济资本激励
“双一流”
High-level talents competition
Economic capital incentive
Double first-class