银行业竞争是否导致商业银行过度风险承担——基于15家商业银行面板数据的实证检验

Whether Banking Competition Leads to Excessive Risk-taking of Commercial Banks——An Empirical Study on Panel Data of 15 Commercial Banks

随着我国利率市场化改革步伐的加快、外资银行的涌入及互联网金融的异军突起,金融市场的竞争不断加剧,商业银行面临着前所未有的竞争压力,关于银行业竞争是否导致商业银行过度风险承担的担忧也逐渐增多。本文选取15家商业银行2008-2016年的面板数据,在合理确定商业银行过度风险承担衡量标准的基础上,实证检验了银行业竞争对商业银行过度风险承担的影响。研究发现,我国银行业竞争与商业银行过度风险承担之间不是简单的线型关系,而是正"U"型关系,当银行业竞争达到或超过临界值时,就会导致商业银行过度风险承担行为的发生。银行业竞争不仅对商业银行过度风险承担的顺周期性具有促进作用,而且在其影响过程中还表现出异质性特征。

With the rapid pace of interest rate liberalization in China, the influx of foreign banks and the emerge of Internet finance, the competition in financial markets has intensified, and commercial banks are facing unprecedented competition pressure. Concerns have also increased about whether the banking competition has led to the excessive risk of commercial banks. This paper se- lected the panel data of 15 commercial banks in 2008-2016, on the basis of rational determination of commercial banks over the risk measure, and empirically studied of the impact of banking competition on excessive risk taken by commercial banks. The results showed that the relationship between banking competition and excessive risk-taking of commercial banks is not a simple linear relationship, but a positive ＂U＂ relationship. When the banking competition reaches or exceeds the critical value, it will lead to the occurrence of excessive risk bearing behavior of commercial banks. Banking competition not only promotes the procyclicality of excessive risk taken by commercial banks, but also shows heterogeneity in the process of its influence.