基于金融排斥视角的金融扶贫的博弈分析

Game Analysis of Financial Poverty Alleviation Based on Perspective of Financial Exclusion

文章通过建立两个博弈：政府与贫困户之间的演化博弈模型、贫困户与合作社之间不完美信息条件下的动态博弈模型,分析了精准扶贫中的金融扶贫的困境,得出三点结论：第一,政府对不接受技能培训的贫困户进行惩罚（θF）大于政府对该过程进行监督的成本（E）时,即θF〉E时,政府与贫困户的演化博弈有两个均衡解。

This paper establishes an evolutionary game model between the government and the poor, and a dynamic game model under the condition of imperfect information between the poor and the cooperatives to analyze the plight of financial poverty alleviation in the course of precision poverty alleviation. Three conclusions are drawn as follows： first, there are two equilibrium solutions to the evolutionary game of the government and the poor when the governmental penalty on the poverty-stricken households（θF） that refuse skill training is larger than the cost of its supervision on the process（E）; second, when θF is smaller than E,there is a unique equilibrium between the government and the low-income households, that is, the latter are able to receive planting and breeding skills training while the government does not exert supervision on the process; thirdly, the dynamic game between the poverty-stricken households and the co-operatives indicates that the former are able to solve the problems in farming and breeding by joining the production cooperatives.