大科学工程关键元器件采购质量控制研究

Study on Quality Control Contract of Key Components Procurement in Large Science Projects

针对国内大科学工程关键元器件质量控制问题,基于委托代理理论,通过引入信息租金建立关键元器件外协供应商和购买商的期望收益函数模型,运用最优化原理求解外协供应商最优生产过程投资水平、购买商最优质量检验水平和信息租金大小并进行算例分析。研究结果表明:当关键元器件外协供应商提高生产过程投资水平时,其质量预防水平将提高,购买商的质量检验水平将显著下降,而购买商支付的信息租金随着质量检验水平增加呈倒U型变化趋势。在完全信息条件下,购买商和外协供应商组成两级供应链系统联合决策:为最大程度激励外协供应商显著提高自身期望收益,购买商需保持较高的质量检验水平,但自身期望收益会显著降低;为提高供应链整体期望收益,购买商需保持相对较低的质量检验水平,自身期望收益不会大幅降低,但外协供应商的期望收益也不会大幅增加。

In view of the quality control of key components in domestic large science engineering, this paper establishes the expected income function model of key component outsourcing suppliers and purchasers based on principal - agent theory, introduces information rent, uses the optimization principle to solve optimal production process investment level, optimal quality inspection level and information rent level of the purchaser, and gives an example. The results show that, the quality prevention level will be improved and the quality inspection level of buyers will decrease significantly, when the key component suppliers increase investment level in production process. However, the information rent paid by purchasers shows an inverted U - shaped trend with the increase of quality inspection level. Under the condition of complete information, buyers and external suppliers form a joint decision making of two levels of the supply chain system ： in order to motivate the supplier to increase his expected income significantly, the buyer needs to maintain a high level of quality inspection, but his expected returns are significantly reduced ; in order to improve the overall expected return of the supply chain, the buyer needs to maintain a relatively low level of quality inspection, then his expected income will not be significantly reduced, and the supplier＇s expected income also wont increase greatly.