摘要
资金供需主体利益难于权衡的问题一直是制约科技金融快速发展的重要障碍。以科技型中小企业和商业银行作为科技金融的参与主体,运用演化博弈的方法建立两个主体间的演化博弈模型,设定相关变量,从而得到复制动态方程,以此为基础分析两博弈主体之间的均衡关系。通过分析得到能够影响两个参与科技金融的博弈主体选择合作策略的稳定性影响因素,并引入相应的监督和惩罚机制。
The difficulty of balancing the interest between capital suppliers and demanders has been important obstacle which hinders the development of sci - tech finance. Taking the SMEs and commercial banks as participants of sci - tech finance, this paper sets up an evolutionary game model, sets relevant variables, and obtains replicated dynamic equation, and the equilibrium relationship between two players is analyzed on the basis of this equation. Through analysis, the paper finds out stability factors that can affect cooperation strategy of two players involved in the science and technology finance, and introduces corresponding supervision and punishment mechanism.
作者
杨宜
徐鲲
徐枫
Yang Yi;Xu Kun;Xu Feng(Beijing Union University, Beijing 100101, China)
出处
《科技管理研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2018年第10期204-211,共8页
Science and Technology Management Research
基金
北京市属高校"长城学者"培养计划项目"科技金融网络演化对科技型企业竞争优势的影响研究"(CIT&TCD20150313)
北京市自然科学基金项目"科技金融网络的结构
演化及创新机制研究"(14I10261)
北京市哲学社会科学规划研究基地一般项目"ECFA背景下京台金融合作模式研究"(14JDJGB044)
关键词
科技金融
供需主体
演化博弈
合作策略
sci-tech finance
capital suppliers and demanders
evolutionary game
cooperation strategy
