雾霾背景下政府监管与交通企业低碳行为演化博弈

Evolutionary Game Analysis of Government Regulation and Low-Carbon Transportation Behavior Under the Background of Smog

雾霾背景下,针对城市低碳交通建设问题,考虑第三方公众的监督作用,构建政府监管部门与交通企业的演化博弈模型,建立复制动态方程,得到不同情形下政府和企业的演化稳定策略;并通过数值仿真,分析监管成功率、第三方举报率对政府策略选择的影响。研究表明,交通企业低碳策略的实施受到政府监管力度、查处成功率以及第三方举报率的影响。在不同情势下,政府部门可以通过理性决策和策略选择,有效遏制企业非低碳的违规行为,为城市低碳交通体系的建设提供参考建议。

An evolutionary game model of government regulators and transportation enterprises considering third-party supervisions is established under the background of smog,aiming to deal with the issue of the construction of low-carbon transportation system.Evolutionary stable strategies under different circumstances between regulators and enterprises are obtained by formulating replicated dynamics equations.The impacts of regulatory success rate and third-party reports probability on strategy selections are analyzed using both mathematical and numerical analysis. The results show that low-carbon implementations of enterprises are affected by non-compliance penalties,success rate of government regulations,and third-party regulations.It is wise for the authority,when faced with different contexts,to undertake various initiatives to effectively curb enterprise irregularities.This paper can provide crucial guidance for the development of low-carbon transportation systems.