一种第二人称道德理论的可能性——阿奎那的德性伦理学及其当代意义

A Moral Theory of Second-personal Perspective:On Thomas Aquinas's Virtue Theory and Its Implications

自从意大利学者约瑟·阿岜以人称的方式划分道德哲学,西方主流伦理范式大多被认定为第一人称或第三人称的道德理论。直到近期,中世纪哲学的研究成果才表明存在一种第二人称的道德哲学,这就是阿奎那的德性伦理学。这一创见本应对当代道德哲学产生深远的影响,然而,由于中世纪哲学研究方法的专业化与学界对阿奎那思想的偏见,鲜有学者注意到阿奎那德性伦理学的第二人称向度。为此,本文特地使用当代道德哲学的方法(分析、描述与类比),从全局的角度重新阐释阿奎那德性理论的第二人称图景;并借鉴认知科学与心理学的前沿理论,证明阿奎那德性理论的第二人称交往符合人类的一般认知方式,对当代道德哲学亦具有重要的启发意义。

Since Italian scholar Giuseppe Abbd＇s demarcation of moral philosophy from the perspectives of ＂person＂, the majority of western ethical norms are considered to be either first- personal or third-personal. Yet, recently, the research of medieval philosophy reveals that there is a second-personal moral philosophy, namely, the virtue theory of Thom Aquinas. The innova- tion were supposed to have great influence on modern moral philosophy, however, due to the professionalization of medieval philosophy and the biased attitude towards Aquinas＇s thought, it remains unnoticed and unvalued among moral philosophers. In order to solve the problem, by u- sing the method of modern moral philosophy （analysis, analogy and description） on purpose, this article interprets the second-personal blueprint of Aquinags virtue theory; and it also argues that Aquinas＇s second-personal communicatio is based on the second-personal cognitive mode of hu- mankind, and thus although with a theistic form, it has important implications for modern moral philosophy.