劳动保护:保护员工还是优待高管?——基于业绩薪酬敏感性视角

Labor Protection: Protect Employees or Give Preferential Treatment to Executives? From a Perspective of Performance-pay Sensitivity

2008年的新《劳动合同法》是否真的保护了企业的基层员工与增加企业的价值,至今学术界仍在进行激烈的讨论。文章利用大样本的实证研究方法,分析了劳动保护对企业的业绩薪酬敏感性的影响,并识别该影响在员工和高管间是否有所差异,以获得劳动保护经济后果的新证据。研究发现,劳动保护降低了企业整体的业绩薪酬敏感性,降低了高管却提高了员工的业绩薪酬敏感性;考虑行业因素后发现劳动保护增加了高劳动密集型企业的业绩薪酬敏感性,而且在增加高劳动密集型企业员工业绩薪酬敏感性的同时降低了高管的业绩薪酬敏感性;进一步研究发现公司治理可以抑制劳动保护对企业业绩薪酬敏感性的不利影响。文章丰富了《劳动合同法》经济后果研究的文献,说明劳动保护法律实施需要同时考虑高管和员工的利益,实现企业内部的利益相关者之间的"互利共赢"的局面。

In order to strengthen the protection of labors＇ legitimate rights and interests, and build stable and harmonious labor relations, China has continuously promoted the reform of labor market system. For example, the ＂Minimum Wage Regulation＂ has been enacted in 2004, and the ＂Labor Contract Law＂ has been implemented in 2008. The promulgation and implementation of the legal system can improve the protection of legitimate rights and interests of labors to a great extent. As a representative of labor protection system, does the new ＂Labor Contract Law＂ really protect the enterprise grass-roots staff and increase the value of the enterprise？ Up to now, it still inspires fierce discussion in academic circle. Based on China＇ s A-share listed data, and using the empirical study of large sample research method, we study the influence of labor protection （LP） on enterprise performance-pay sensitivity （PPS~ and identify differences of this effect between employees and executives to find new evidences of the economic consequences of labor protection. The results show that LP reduces the overall PPS in an enterprise, and reduces the executives＇ PPS but increases employees＇ PPS; after considering industry factor, it indicates that LP adds PPS of employees and enterprises with high labor intensity, but lowers executives＇ PPS; corporate governance can inhibit the negative effects of LP on enterprise PPS. This paper shows that some certain rules in current ＂Labor Contract Law＂ may be disconnected from possible reality, and especially, rights relation adjustment in the ＂Labor Contract Law＂ is restricted by social economic relations, so this law can gain labor protection of the rights of employees at the grass-roots level, but may prejudice the legitimate interests of executives, and then decrease the efficiency of enterprise incentive mechanism, leading to a sharp decline in enterprise value in the end. To solve this problem, we should further improve the supporting system of labor legislation and socialist market economy system, and speed up the transformation of development way, so as to create sound conditions and system base for the construction of harmonious labor relationship and a harmonious society. This paper enriches the literature of the economic consequences research of ＂Labor Contract Law＂, and shows that the enforcement of labor protection law should consider the interests of executives and employees at the same time, in order to reach the ＂win-win＂ situation between internal stakeholders, then build fair and justice enterprise labor relations, and win the maximization of social welfare.