社会协调的行为机理及其实验证据——兼对杜宁华先生批判的回应之二

Behavior Mechanism of Social Coordination and Relevant Experimental Evidence: A Response to Mr. Du Ninghua's Critique

运用萃取法和溯因法可以从大量的日常生活和行为实验中提炼出"为己利他"行为机理。基于"为己利他"行为机理,我们不仅可以很好地理解广泛存在的社会合作现象,而且也有助于将个体互动导向社会合作,因而可以成为社会协调的基本行为机理。同时,"为己利他"行为机理不仅可以有效解释各种合作性的博弈均衡,也可以很好地预见博弈的均衡结果,因而也就可以成为博弈论的基本分析思维。显然,这些都在文章所列举的那些典型博弈模型以及相应的博弈实验中得到充分印证。此外,"为己利他"行为机理很大程度上也契合了众多的行为实验结果,这些行为实验都在不同维度上引入了现实因素而不是遵循主流的"双盲"程序,因而也可以作为对杜宁华先生批判的回应。

Economic theories usually cannot be confirmed or falsified by empirical or experimental data with obvious locality. Accordingly, the criterion of evaluating economic theories does not rely on predictive ability but on explanatory ability. Furthermore, internal validity embodies the explanatory ability of a theory, and reflects the behavioral logic in the real world. In order to get the behavioral logic in the real world, the situation design of economic experiments needs to introduce real factors gradually instead of focusing on the same factor at every time as well as setting the factors irrelevant to the reality. At the same time, it needs to use extraction and abduction methods as well as corresponding consilience thinking in order to draw out the real behavioral mechanism from isolated experimental conclusions and discoveries. Based on this thinking, on the one hand, it needs to make consilience between instinct and pro-sociality embedded in humanity; on the other hand, it needs to make combination between the basic purpose of human action and corresponding socialized methods. Thus, it can draw out the behavioral mechanism concerning ＂for oneself by benefiting others＂ from the daily life and behavioral experiments which is more close to the reality than economic man： achieving his own goals by the ＂altruism＂ cooperative means. According to this paper, the behavioral mechanism concerning ＂for oneself,by benefiting others＂ can make a consistent explanation and prediction for the equilibrium results of basic game types： it not only effectively explains the widespread phenomena of social cooperation at different levels, but also helps to guide individual interaction to social cooperation. Thus, the behavioral mechanism concerning ＂for oneself by benefiting others＂ is also the basic behavioral mechanism of social coordination. At the same time, the behavioral mechanism concerning ＂for oneself＇by benefiting others＂ can be tested and confirmed by a large number of, behavioral economics experiments： the subjects tend to care for others＇ income as well as the f,airness of income-distribution in experiments. As a result, the outcomes of cooperative equilibrium can be well predicted by this behavioral mechanism. Therefore, the behavioral mechanism concerning ＂for oneself by benefiting others＂ provides a better game thinking than the hypothesis of rational economic man. And it not only helps to analyze the interactive behaviors in the real world, but also reveals the mechanism of maximizing revenues in real behavioral interaction. Accordingly, it provides a basis of more reasonable behavioral logic f,or game theory, especially for cooperative game theory. And then, the behavioral mechanism concerning ＂for oneself,by benefiting others＂ can explain not only the behaviors and phenomena that traditional economic theory can explain,but also the behaviors and phenomena that traditional economic theory cannot explain. Accordingly, it provides a solid micro-analysis framework for behavioral economics. Finally, the behavioral mechanism concerning ＂for oneself by benefiting others＂ comes from the consilience and extraction f,orms a series of experimental results, and some real factors are drawn into these experiments in different dimensions but these experiments do not stick to the mainstream ＂double-blind＂ program. Therefore, this paper not only makes a promotion and development of,game theory and economic theories, but also gives a response to Mr. Du Ninghua＇ s critique.