零售商纵向公平和横向公平偏好对供应链均衡的影响研究

Research on Supply Chain Equilibrium with the Considering of Distributional and Peer-Induced Fairness Preference of Retailers

针对供应链中存在公平偏好的问题，构建了一个供应商、两个零售商的两级供应链Stackelberg模型，采用参照点效应建立公平偏好效用函数，分析了两个零售商同时具有纵向公平偏好、零售商2具有纵向及横向公平偏好和零售商1具有纵向公平偏好时对供应链均衡结果的影响．研究表明：i）零售商的纵向公平偏好会提高其分享系数，降低供应商利润；ii）零售商的横向公平偏好会降低零售商的分享系数，提高供应商利润；iii）零售商2对零售商1的分享系数的先验预测方差会降低供应商利润．经数值分析验证，在供应商占主导地位的供应链中，供应商须充分考虑零售商的公平偏好特征，可通过管理手段提高其横向公平偏好、降低其纵向公平偏好及实现报价信息透明的方式提高自身利润．

Fairness preference has important effect on the supply chain equilibrium strategies. With distributional and peer-induced fairness Preference taken into account in this paper, a Stackleberg game model is built for a one-supplier and two-retailer supply chain. It pointed out that i） in the presence of distributional fairness alone, the revenue sharing rate is lower than the revenue sharing rate without fairness, and the supplier profit is decreasing; ii） in the presence of both types of fairness, the second revenue sharing rate is higher than the first revenue sharing rate; and the supplier makes a higher profit than that in the presence of dis- tributional fairness alone;iii） the level of uncertainty of Retailer l＇s sharing rate in Retailer 2＇s prior belief may decrease the supplier＇s profits. Finally, a general conclusion is proved, that is, the supplier who occupies the leading position in supply chain should give full considera- tion to fairness preference of retailers and take actions to reduce their distributional fairness preference, increase their peer-induced fairness preference to improve his own profits.