关于一项大学课程考核机制实施效率的博弈分析

Game Analysis on the Implementation Efficiency of a University Curriculum Assessment Mechanism

期末考试与平常考核相结合是当前大学课程考核的常用方式，在操作失当的情况下，易产生乐善好施悖论．为剖析该结论，构造了一个动态博弈模型表征师生之间的利益互动关系，以博弈均衡阐释问题的形成机理．研究结果表明，为提升博弈双方效用，改善高校教学绩效，可从调整参与人行动先后顺序、弱化支付函数相关性等方面予以着手．

The combination of the final exam and the ordinary assessment is the common way of the current university curriculum assessment. In the case of improper operation, it is easy to produce the Samaritan＇s Dilemma. In order to analyze this conclusion, a dynamic game model is constructed to represent the interaction of interests between teachers and students, explaining the formation mechanism of the problem by game equilibrium. The results show that in order to enhance the utility of both sides of the game and improve the teaching performance in colleges and universities, we can start with adjusting the order of actions of participants and weakening the correlation of payment functions.