摘要
农地经营权抵押贷款政策已出台,但法律问题以及制度细节问题并不完备,由于金融机构和农户两大农地经营权抵押贷款的供需主体存在行为博弈,而导致农地抵押贷款政策背离了初衷,无法发挥预期效果。以抵押贷款供需主体的行为博弈为中心展开,对农地经营权抵押贷款政策的内生风险控制提出制度完善的建议。
The mortgage loan policy for management right of agricultural land has been issued,but the legal issues and the details of the system are not complete.Because there are behavioral games between the supply and demand main bodies of financial institutions and farmer households operating mortgage mortgage loans,the mortgage loan policy of agricultural land divorced from the original intention,can not play the expected results.This dissertation focuses on the behavioral game of the subjects of mortgage loan supply and demand,and puts forward sound suggestions for the endogenous risk control of the mortgage loan policy of farmland management rights.
作者
赵春江
付兆刚
ZHAO Chun- jiang;FU Zhao- gang(School of Finance and Public Management, Harbin University of Commerce, Harbin 150028, China;School of Business, Lingnan Teachers College,Zhanjing 524048, China)
出处
《经济问题》
CSSCI
北大核心
2018年第6期53-58,共6页
On Economic Problems
基金
国家社会科学基金项目"农地规模化流转背景下农业生产组织方式演化与创新研究"(16CJY053)
黑龙江省社会科学基金项目"黑龙江省现代服务业与现代农业耦合发展研究"(17JYB090)
关键词
农地经营权抵押贷款
背离风险
行为博弈
制度规制
farmland management right mortgage loan
deviation risk
behavioral game
system regulation
