道德义务如何可能？--历史语境下的康德“自律原则”

How Is Moral Obligation Possible?Kant's “Principle of Autonomy”in Context

本文将康德伦理学置于18世纪关于道德义务和约束性争论的背景之下,以更好地理解其关于自律原则和道德法则的概念。在对这一争论进行概述之后,作者首先阐明了沃尔夫(1679~1754)如何将作为纯粹律法概念的约束性转变为关于人类行动的一般理性概念。沃尔夫试图表明我们对于自然(或道德)法则的认识就足以使我们能够根据它们来行动。受到义务的约束而行动仅仅意味着有行动的好理由。这意味着,人并不一定需要有外在的强制力或惩罚措施就能够根据法则来行动。除此以外,这也不意味着人需要有某种特定的上帝概念才能认识到道德行动的理性基础。作者转向了沃尔夫之后哲学的新发展。作者讨论了德国的后沃尔夫主义者埃伯哈德(1739~1809)的思想,埃伯哈德尝试弥合沃尔夫的理性主义和英国情感主义之间的鸿沟。最后,作者讨论了康德关于义务约束力的思想。与他的自由意志概念一样,康德的义务概念也具有与沃尔夫主义的意志模式对立的独特特质。通过自由意志和先验观念论的预设,康德以自律的方式强化了沃尔夫的理性本质主义立场。

In this paper,the author situates Kant＇s moral philosophy within the context of the 18 th century debates about moral obligation and duty,in order to provide a better understanding of Kant＇s conceptions of autonomy and moral law. After a general introduction into these debates,the author clarifies how Cristian Wolff transforms the concept of obligation from a purely juridical conception into a general rational concept of human actions. Wolff is eager to show that our cognition of the natural（ or moral） law suffices to act according to it. To be obligated just means to have good reasons for action; it does not mean that a person needs to have external constraints or sanctions,as was famously argued by Samuel von Pufendorf,to act according to the law. Beyond that,it does not mean that a person needs to have any specialized concept of God in order to recognize the rational ground of actions or to be motivated to act morally. In a second step,the author turns to new philosophical developments. On the one side,he discusses the position of the Scottish jurist and philosopher Henry Home,Lord Kames,who tried to show against Francis Hutcheson the need to find a convincing conception of obligation within the moral sense tradition of practical philosophy. On the other side,he discusses the moral writings of Johann August Eberhard,a representative of the younger generation of Wolffians in Germany,who tried hard to bridge the gulf between Wolffian rationalism and British sentimentalism.Finally,the author discusses some unique characteristics of Kant＇s own conception of obligation,like his conception of free will,which stand in opposition to the Wolffiain model of volition. With his conception of the free will and the presupposition of transcendental idealism,Kant radicalized the Wolffian position of rational essentialism in the form of the principle of autonomy without having to leave it unexplained how the lack of virtue and vice are possible.