中国式影子银行的风险溯源与监管创新

Risk Tracing and Regulatory Innovation of Shadow Banking in China

我国的"影子银行"实践并不具有脱媒性,而是代替银行成为投资者和融资者之间的信用中介;其风险形态因此也与传统银行近似,突出体现为金融机构层面上的期限错配。与美国不同,我国形成上述风险特征的制度性根源主要不在金融机构和金融市场的二元监管结构,而更多归因于长期以来的金融抑制策略、路径偏好及思维定式。就法律政策选择而言,一方面确有必要强化银行的信用中介专营权及相应规则,抑制监管套利、防范系统性风险;另一方面要考虑对现有监管制度进行盘整,使影子银行活动更加有效地与银行信贷业务形成互补,实现"服务实体经济、防控金融风险、深化金融改革"等三项任务。

China＇s shadow banking practice has not processed the disintermediation as occurred in the United States. They merely replaced traditional banks as the credit intermediary. Thus the risk that shadow banking face in China is not distinguishable from that of traditional banks in nature, highlighting the maturity mismatch at the institutional level. This kind of risk has been plausibly addressed by the current financial regulation, but many financial institutions did not comply with these rules due to the intrinsic financial repression caused thereof. To contain the risk of China＇s shadow banking, one key is to reinforce the regulatory framework of traditional banking and apply it towards shadow banking when they carry out the credit intermediation to level the playing field and deter the regulation arbitrage. The more crucial part is to upgrade the whole financial system to synergy the institutional level and the market level, and to eliminate the adverse effects of financial repression. The new rules seem conducive to ensure that China＇s shadow banking activities become more in line with the global practice, and supplementary to the traditional financial business in a healthier and compatible manner.