企业内部控制质量与银行借款契约——基于融资成本的视角

Quality of internal control and bank loan contract——based on the perspective of financing cost

以2011-2014年沪深两市A股(不包括创业板)上市公司为研究样本,从融资成本视角,探讨上市公司内部控制质量与银行借款契约的关系。研究发现:内部控制质量与银行借款成本呈负相关关系,即内部控制质量高的企业获得的银行借款成本更低。研究结论为经济转轨环境下增强企业建立健全内部控制意识、保护债权人利益和促进信贷市场健康发展有政策启示。

The relationship between the quality of internal control of listed companies and the contract of bank borrowing is discussed from the perspective of financing cost, taking the case of listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock exchanges（excluding the GEM） from 2011 to 2014 as research sample. It is found that the quality of internal control is negatively correlated with the cost of bank borrowing, that is, the cost of bank borrowing with high internal control is lower. The research conclusion has policy implications for enhancing enterprises＇ awareness of internal control, protecting creditors＇ interests and promoting the healthy development of credit market in the context of economic transformation.