税收征管、纳税遵从与企业贿赂——一个遵从成本视角的分析

Tax Administration,Compliance and Bribery:An Analysis from Compliance Costs

企业贿赂的前因变量是什么?上述问题的回答有利于完善政企关系和腐败治理体系。笔者聚焦于税收征管中的企业贿赂行为,借鉴防合谋契约模型并放松假定条件,探究腐败交易形成的机理,认为企业贿赂存在两种情况:从税收不遵从中获得帮助和取得对自身有利的税收待遇。基于2012年世界银行中国企业调查数据中非国有企业样本进行经验分析,研究结果表明:企业被检查的次数越多、企业遵从成本越高,企业倾向于贿赂的可能性越大,而企业对法治公正性感知的上升将会弱化遵从成本因素的影响,同时还考虑了税收管理和税收制度因素的影响。上述发现为完善税收征管程序从而防范腐败发生提供了思路,并丰富了对外部环境、企业主观感知和企业特征影响企业政治行为选择的认识。

Why does the company bribe？ The answer is helpful to improve the relationship between enterprise and government and the system of anticorruption. Contract theory of preventing collusion is applied and extended to investigate the micro mechanism of corruption. This paper focuses on the bribery in tax collection,and finds that company pays for getting assistance in tax evasion and beneficial treatment in tax compliance.Empirical research based on survey data of Chinese private enterprises in 2012 by World Bank shows that the higher frequency of being checked is and the higher compliance costs are,the more possible the company tends to bribe,and fairness perception will weaken the influence of compliance cost. At the same time,the effect of tax administration and tax system are also taken into consideration. These finds provide thoughts for improving tax collection and administration,and enrich understanding of enterprise political behavior choice,which is affected by external environment,enterprise characteristic and enterprise subjective perception.