摘要
本文以2005—2016年我国沪深两市A股非金融上市公司为研究样本,通过构建CEO权力和内部治理综合指标,首先检验了CEO权力与代理成本之间的关系,然后引入内部治理机制指标,检验内部治理机制对CEO权力与代理成本关系的影响。实证结果表明,代理成本与CEO权力显著正相关,完善的内部治理机制能够显著减弱CEO权力对于代理成本的影响。文章丰富了CEO权力以及代理成本相关理论,对理论研究以及实践指导能有较强的指导意义。
This paper takes the A-share non-financial listed companies of Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets in China from 2005 to 2016 as the research sample. By building a comprehensive index of CEO power and internal governance, this paper first examines the relationship between CEO power and agency cost, and then introduces internal governance mechanism indicators to test the impact of internal governance mechanism on the relationship between CEO power and agency cost. The empirical results show that agency cost has a significant positive correlation with CEO power, and a sound internal governance mechanism can significantly weaken the impact of CEO power on agency eost. The article enriches the theory of CEO power and agency cost, which can be instructive for theoretical research and practical guidance.
作者
孙萌瑶
薛坤坤
Sun Mengyao;Xue Kunkun(Nankai University, Tianjin 300071, China)
出处
《未来与发展》
2018年第6期60-65,共6页
Future and Development
基金
国家自然科学基金青年项目"创始人资源禀赋与反收购条款设立的双向影响研究:理论与应用"(71702114)
国家社会科学基金青年项目"国有僵尸企业的银行借款及其对股东利益的影响研究"(17CGL060)
