年度业绩、任期业绩与国企高管晋升——基于央企控股公司样本的研究

Annual Performance, Term Performance and Promotion of SOE's Executives: A Study Based on the State-owned Central Enterprises' Holding Companies

国有企业行业和经营模式的特殊性,决定了单一的、以盈利为核心的业绩考核方式不能起到提升其经营能力和竞争力的作用。目前国有企业实施的年度业绩与任期业绩相结合的业绩考评模式,意在激励企业更加重视运营水平和经营效率的提升,而非仅关注短期盈利。然而,这一业绩考评模式究竟发挥了多大的作用尚不明确。本文基于2005-2016年央企控股公司的相关数据,研究了年度业绩、任期业绩与高管晋升之间的关系,实证分析显示,只有企业利润对高管的晋升概率有显著正向影响,在控制内生性及进行稳健性检验后,这一关系仍是显著的。其他年度业绩指标与任期业绩指标对高管晋升概率并无显著影响。国有企业利润的重要性以及任期业绩与高管之间对应的模糊性是造成这一现象的重要原因。实证研究还表明,国企高管晋升中存在"相机抉择"的机制,国家整体经济状况不同,利润在国企高管晋升中的权重也有变化,这也印证了利润在业绩考核中的核心地位,回答了为什么利润在国企高管晋升中有如此重要的作用。近期已付诸实施的国有企业分类改革或许能改变这种局面。

The particularity of state-owned enterprises＇ industry and business model determines that the single profit-taking per- formance evaluation method cannot play a role in enhancing the ability and competitiveness of state-owned enterprises. To remedy the defect of single profit-taking performance evaluation method, the performance evaluation implemented on the state-owned en- terprises is a combination model of annual performance and term performance, intending to encourage the state-owned enterprises to pay more attention to operation and operational efficiency, rather than only focusing on short-term profitability. Yet the merits of this performance evaluation model still unknown. Our empirical anal- ysis based on the relationship between central enterprises holding companies＇ annual performance, term performance and incentives from 2005 to 2016, shows that only profit have significant impact on the probability of executives＇ promotion, which means the com- bination performance evaluation of annual performance and term performance hasn＇t played an important role so far. This relation- ship is still significant after controlling endogeneity and performing robustness tests. Other annual performance indicators and term performance indicators have no significant effect on the promo- tion probability of senior executives. The principal＇s emphasis on profits and the ambiguity between the term performance and the executive are important causes of this phenomenon. SOE＇s profit is very important to the GDP growth of China, thus profit must be the most important performance evaluation index, especially in the years China＇ GDP performance is not very good, which was proved by our empirical study that shows the principal will make ＂discre- tionary decision＂ in the promotion of state-owned enterprises＇ ex- ecutives, and profit will play a more important role in promotion in the year China＇s economic performance is not that good. Dynamic adjustment of each performance＇ weight will be made according to the economic status, which also confirms the profit＇s core position in the state-owned enterprises＇ performance evaluation, and the above-mentioned situation may also provide answer the question such as why profit has such an important role in the executives＇ pro- motion. State-owned enterprises＇ classification reform implemented recently may be able to change this situation.