产品市场竞争、代理成本与研发信息披露

Product Market Competition,Agency Costs and R&D Disclosure

以2007年~2015年非金融类上市公司年报为样本,考察不同产品市场竞争环境下代理成本与研发词频之间的关系,以及开发成本、产权性质在其中的影响,以此探讨信息不对称情形下,管理层与企业利益协同程度对研发文本信息披露水平的影响。研究发现,激烈的产品市场竞争对管理层自利性行为起到了约束作用,代理成本越高,越倾向于增加研发文本信息披露水平;但高额的开发成本会对两者的正向关系起到显著的削弱作用;相比于国有企业,民营企业的代理成本与研发词频之间的正相关关系更为显著。

Based on the panel data of China＇s non-financial listed companies from 2007 to 2015,this paper empirically tests the relationship between agency costs and RD term frequency under different environments of product market competition,and the impact of development costs and the nature of property rights,in order to explore the synergy between management and corporate interests in the context of information asymmetry. This study finds that fierce competition in the product market has a restraining effect on the selfinterested behavior of management;The higher the agency cost,the more likely it is to increase the level of RD text information disclosure; However,the high development cost will weaken the positive relationship between them. Compared with state-owned enterprises,the positive correlation is even more significant between the agency costs of private enterprises and RD term frequency.