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专利倾向与专利审查的互动效应及其政策含义 被引量:3

The interaction effect on the patent propensity and the patent examination and its policy implication
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摘要 专利申请量的持续性增长使得全球主要专利局面临越来越严重的审查积压问题,因此纷纷开始着手改造本国的专利审查系统。本文探讨了专利倾向与专利审查行为之间相互影响的互动机理,并进一步分析了互动传导机制对技术创新效应的影响机理。在此基础上,本文提出了对我国专利审查费用体系及审查资源配置体系进行改造,通过影响不同质量专利申请的专利倾向进而提高专利审查效益,从而达到利用专利系统促进技术创新效应的目的。 Patent application continued growth makes the major patent offices face more and more serious patent examination backlog in the world,so they have begun to reform their patent examination system. This paper discusses the interaction affect mechanism between patent propensity and patent examination behavior,and the transmission affect mechanism on technological innovation. On this basis,this paper presents the reform suggestion on the patent examination fees system and the patent examination resources allocation system by affecting the patent application quantity and quality in different patent propensity to achieve the effect of promoting technological innovation.
作者 文家春 卢娣 WEN Jia-chun;LU Di(Shanghai International College of Intellectual Property, Tongji University, Shanghai 200092, China;China Commercial Law Firm, Shenzhen 518005, China)
出处 《科学学研究》 CSSCI CSCD 北大核心 2018年第6期961-966,共6页 Studies in Science of Science
基金 国家自然科学基金面上项目(71473095)
关键词 专利倾向 专利审查行为 技术创新效应 政策含义 patent propensity patent examination behavior technological innovation effect policy implication
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