考虑盗版的双渠道供应链制造商定价及质量信息披露策略

Manufacturer’s Pricing and Quality Disclosure Strategies in a Dual-channel Supply Chain with Piracy

研究了存在盗版制造商的双渠道供应链中，只有正版制造商具有质量信息披露能力，且盗版产品可以“搭便车”时，正版制造商的定价及质量信息披露决策。建模描述了消费者购买正版、盗版产品的效用权衡，得出正版产品的渠道需求及终端定价，以及不同产品质量条件下制造商的批发价定价策略，进一步得到披露成本约束下的质量信息披露策略，分析了盗版水平对制造商定价及信息披露决策的影响。研究发现：盗版产品的存在导致零售商和制造商采取分段定价策略；盗版程度越高，制造商的议价能力越低，可以制定的批发价越低，且制造商会在更低的产品质量水平下决策；制造商只有在产品质量、披露成本同时满足一定条件时，才愿意披露信息。

This study investigated how the existing of piracy may influence manufacturer- s pricing and quality disclosure decision in a dual-channel supply chain, consisting of a upstream manufacturer,a downstream retailer and an illegal manufacture providing pirated product. End consumers＇ different surplus of purchasing legal and illegal product and the channel＇s demand and optimal retail price were described. Then the manufacturer ＇s wholesale pricing strategy under different quality level was derived. Moreover, the manufacturer- s disclosure strategy under restrictive disclosure cost was analyzed. How manufacturer＇s strategies are affected by different piracy level was also investigated. Results suggest that. in the presence of pirated product, the retail and wholesale pricing differed under different situation ; the higher the pirate rate is, the less power the manufacturer has to set high wholesale price,and decisions are made in a lower quality level;the manufacturer discloses the quality to consumers if and only if the quality and the disclosure cost are both appropriate.