摘要
妥善处理僵尸企业是我国供给侧结构改革的重要内容。本文以僵尸企业投资行为选择为切入点,采用2003-2015年中国上市公司数据分析僵尸企业投资效率,以及政府补助对僵尸企业投资效率的影响。我国上市僵尸企业存在由投资不足所驱动的非效率投资行为,政府补助加剧了僵尸企业非效率投资行为;我国上市僵尸企业普遍对"自我救赎"持消极态度,政府的财政补贴为这种消极氛围提供了"温床"。上述结论可为决策部门制定僵尸企业拯救和退出政策等提供参考。
Properly dealing with zombie firms is an important issue of supply-side reform in China. Taking investment behavior choice of zombie firms as breakthrough point, the paper uses the data of Chinese listed companies during 2003 -2015 as a sample to analyze the problem of investment efficiency of zombie firms, and the effect of government subsidy on investment efficiency of zombie firms. Zombie firms have significant inefficient investment behavior driven by underin- vestment, and government subsidies aggravated the underinvestment of zombie firms ; zombie firms hold a passive ＂self-redemption＂ attitude generally, and government＇s financial subsidies provided a ＂hotbed＂ for this negative atmosphere. The conclusions may provide references for policy-making departments to formulate policies for the rescue and exit of zombie firms.
作者
曾皓
赵静
张征华
ZENG Hao;ZHAO Jing;ZHANG Zheng-hua(College of Accounting, Capital University of Economics and Business, Beijing 100070, China;Jiangxi Modern Agricultural Development Collaborative Innovation Center, Jiangxi Agricultural University, Nanchang 330045, China)
出处
《商业研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2018年第6期32-40,共9页
Commercial Research
基金
江西省社科规划青年博士基金项目
项目编号:16BJ31
江西省高校人文社科研究项目
项目编号:GL162028
首都经济贸易大学研究生科技创新项目资助
关键词
僵尸企业
投资效率
投资过度
投资不足
政府补助
zombie firms
investment efficiency
overinvestment
underinvestment
government subsidy
