资金约束、商业信用与供应链期权合约

Capital Constraint,Trade Credit and Supply Chain Option Contract

在零售商资金受限且存在违约风险、供应商提供商业信用的情形下,本文研究应用期权合约协调供应链问题。理论分析表明,资金约束使得零售商倾向于多采购期权,且期权采购量随着初始资金的增加而减小,随着违约概率的增加而增加,而供应商的最优初始期权生产量仅受其缺货反应能力的影响;缺货反应能力越差,供应商越倾向于生产全部期权购买量。进一步研究得到供应链协调的条件,并发现不能实现集中供应链利润的任意分配。最后通过数值分析发现存在初始资金和违约概率对供应商和整体供应链利润产生正面影响的情形,并得到相关的管理启示。

In the case of a retailer with limited capital and default risk and suppliers providing commercial credit, this paper studies the application of option contracts to coordinate supply chain. The theoretical analysis shows that the financial constraints make the retailers inclined to buy options, and the amount of option purchase decreases with the increase of initial funds, and increases with the increase of the probability of default, but the optimal initial option output of a supplier is affected only by its shortage response capability; the poorer the ability to respond to shortages, the more likely suppliers are to produce all option purchases. Further study obtains the conditions of supply chain coordination and finds that the profit distribution of centralized supply chain cannot be realized. Finally, through numerical analysis, it is found that there is a positive impact of the initial funds and default probability on the profits of the suppliers and the overall supply chain, and the relevant management enlightenment is obtained.