高管薪酬激励、权力配置与会计稳健性——基于协同治理效应视角的分析

Executive Compensation Incentives,Power Allocation and Accounting Conservatism: An Analysis based on the Perspective of Synergistic Effect

从协同治理效应视角,本文应用Basu模型分析高管薪酬激励与公司会计稳健性的相关性,并在此基础上考察了高管控制权对上述关系的影响。研究发现,不同高管薪酬激励水平与会计稳健性的关系存在显著差异,适度的高管薪酬激励与会计稳健性正相关,薪酬激励过高则导致会计稳健性降低;进一步引入权力配置条件下,即当高管兼任董事长或持有公司股权时,高管控制权的增加强化了高管薪酬激励与会计稳健性之间的相关关系。因此,促进高管薪酬激励与会计稳健性发挥协同治理效应,需高度关注政策激励强度及内部权力结构的影响。

Based on the penspective of synergistic effect, the paper employs the classical Basu model to thoroughly ana- lyze the relationship between executive compensation incentives and corporate accounting conservatism, and examines the effect of executive power on the above relationship. The empirical results illustrate that the relationship varies with the degree of executive compensation incentives, that is, moderate executive compensation incentives is positively related to accounting conservatism, while excessive one results in lower accounting conservatism ; under the influence of power allocation, when executives are chairman or holding shares, the increase of executive power will correspondingly enforce the relationship between executive compensation and accounting conservatism. Therefore, in order to enforce the synergetic governance effect of executive compensation incentives and accounting conservatism, it is highly worth more attention to the incentives intensity and the effect of inner power allocation structure.