司法公正概念的反思和重构——以法律论证理论为基础

Reflection and Reconstruction of the Concept of Judicial Justice—Based on the Theory of Legal Argumentation

中国法学界关于司法公正概念的主流观点强调程序公正处于优先地位。这种观点,一方面认为实践或规范性命题的证成是非理性的,另一方面又不能解决如何判断法律适用是不是正确的判断标准。商谈理论是关于实践理性的程序理论,认为实践或规范性命题在理性上是可证成的。法律商谈或论证是建立在一般理性实践商谈理论的基础之上的,是一般理性实践商谈的特殊情形。法律商谈或论证程序限制和限缩了一般理性实践商谈程序的商谈可能性空间,但是,它并不能保证商谈或论证结果是最终的、不可推翻的和唯一的。法庭诉讼程序在时间、社会和实质等方面对法律商谈或论证程序作出了限制和限缩,通过其结束争议和决断机制保证法律决定的最终性、不可推翻性和唯一性。这两种程序规则是两种不同性质的规则,各自具有独立性,它们对于法官做法律决定来说都是不可或缺的,而且相互限制相互制约,共同保证合理的具有法律约束力的法律决定得以产生。

Most Chinese legal scholars think that the judicial justice is essentially dependent on the procedural justice. They do not only deny that the practical or normative proposition can be justified, hut also cannot correctly deal with the subject on the application of law. The discourse theory according to which a practical or normative proposition can be justified is a procedural theory. Legal discourse or legal argument is a special case of general discourse which forms the foundation of it. It limits and reduces the space of discursive possibilities considerably, but it offers no guarantee that its result is final, unalterable and just one. The procedure of legal court proceeding which limits and reduces the spectrum of legal discourse in the temporal, social and substantive dimensions ensures that the legal decision is final, unalterable and just one by means of its rules and mechanisms for ending a debate and for producing a decision. The two types of procedural rule which are entirely different and independent from each other are indispensable to make legal decisions. They mutually intersect and conjointly ensure that the legal decision has rational acceptability and legal force.