政府竞争、股权投资与政府补助

Government Competition,Equity Investment and Subsidy

本文以我国2007-2014年的上市公司为研究样本,检验了上市公司的股权投资与从投资地获得的政府补助之间的关系。研究发现:上市公司若在某地区有股权投资,则更容易从该地获得政府补助。同时,上市公司首次在该地投资、股权投资金额和投资个数都能显著增加上市公司从投资地获得的政府补助。而且,在高GDP压力的地区,股权投资与上市公司获得政府补助之间的关系更加明显。公司以股权投资从地方政府获得的政府补助并不能改善公司会计业绩,这说明地方政府竞争在一定程度上弱化了政府补助的作用。本文从政府竞争与企业投资的视角研究了企业投资行为与政府补助之间的关系,发现了政府通过政府补助吸引外来企业投资的经验证据,以期为评价上市公司投资行为提供支持,并为地方政府合理利用经济控制权提供理论依据。

Based on special Chinese institutional background of financial decentralization, by studying on listed companies＇ observations in China from 2007 to 2014, this paper mainly investigates the relationship between the listed companies＇ equity investment and the subsidies obtained from the lo- cal government. Our research finds that the listed companies can obtain the local government subsidies easier by making equity investment there. Mean- while, the times and amount of the equity investment or whether for the first time of the equity investment can significantly increase their subsidies obtained from the local government. Moreover, the positive influence of the equity investment on obtaining the government subsidies is more remarkable in areas faced with high GDP pressure. The government subsidies obtained through the equity investment did not improve the performance of enterprises, indicating that the government subsidies to a certain extent weakened the role of government subsidies. This paper studies the relationship between corporate invest- ment behavior and government subsidies from the perspective of government competition and corporate investment, finding out that the government attracts corporate investment through government subsidies. We aim at providing new evaluation standards of the investment behaviors for listed companies and of- fering the reference proposals to local governments for rational economic control.