回收渠道竞争下制造商的战略联盟策略选择

Manufacturer’s optimal alliance strategy in closed loop supply chains in the presence of competing recycling channels

考虑由制造商、零售商和第三方回收商构成的闭环供应链,制造商与第三方同时参与废旧产品的回收.根据制造商不同的联盟策略建立了以下四种决策模型：无联盟（模型D）、制造商与零售商联盟（模型MR）、制造商与第三方联盟（模型MC）、制造商与零售商和第三方同时联盟（模型MRC）,分析了回收渠道竞争对制造商最优联盟策略选择的影响.研究表明：1）与第三方独立回收决策情形相比,当回收市场竞争强度分别低于一定的阈值时,模型D和模型MR中制造商进入回收市场对第三方有利,模型MC中制造商进入回收市场对零售商有利.其次,任何联盟形式下选择进入回收市场始终是制造商的占优策略.2）考虑回收竞争的背景下,闭环供应链系统利润并不一定在MRC联盟策略下最优,其比较的结果取决于回收市场的竞争强度.3）从制造商最优联盟策略选择的角度分析,当回收竞争强度小于1/2时,MRC联盟策略对制造商最有利;当回收竞争强度大于1/2时,MR联盟策略是制造商的占优策略.最后,利用算例分析了参数对闭环供应链均衡和制造商最优联盟策略选择的影响.

We consider a closed loop supply chain which consists of a manufacturer, a retailer and a third-party collector. The manufacturer and the third-party are responsible for collecting used prod- ucts. According to the manufacturer＇s alliance strategy, we establish four decision models： No alliance （Model D）, manufacturer-retailer alliance （Model MR）, manufacturer-third party alliance （Model MC） and manufacturer-retailer-third party alliance （Model MRC）. The impact of reverse channel competition on manufacturer＇s optimal alliance strategy is analyzed. We obtain the following results： 1） Compared with single reverse channel case, the manufacturer undertaking the used product collection is beneficial to the third-party in D and MR models and benefits the retailer in the MC model when the reverse channel competition is relatively weak. 2） In the presence of reverse channel competition, the channel system is not always optimal in Model MRC and the comparative result hinges on the reverse channel competition intensity. 3） From the perspective of the manufacturer＇s alliance selection, MRC alliance is optimal when 1 and MR alliance is optimal when the intensity is the reverse channel competition intensity is less than 1 Finally, we use numerical method to analyze the effect of key parameters on the equilibrium larger than 1/2 decisions and the manufacturer＇s optimal alliance strategy.