股票送转与管理者双重迎合

Stock Dividends and Manager's Dual Catering

近年来我国上市公司对股票送转的热情高涨,送转比例不断攀升,上市公司如何进行股票送转决策?本文从公司内部和外部两方面探索了管理者在股票送转决策中的参照系选择以及迎合路径,结果发现:(1)公司内部可参考因素中,名义股价是管理者送转决策的参照系,送转意愿和比例跟随名义股价同向变化,为的是迎合投资者的名义价格幻觉;(2)公司外部可参考因素中,同类公司送转比例是管理者送转决策的参照系,送转意愿和比例跟随同类公司送转比例同向变化,为的是迎合投资者的参考点效应;(3)管理者的送转意愿和比例均跟随内外部参照系同向变化,而且两个参照系之间存在一定的替代效应。本文结果表明,理性管理者为了最优化股票送转决策,存在对投资者名义价格幻觉和参考点效应这两种非理性偏好的双重迎合。本文拓展了迎合理论,为参考点理论提供了新证据,较为全面地揭示了上市公司股票送转决策的机制,具有一定的监管启示。

In recent years, stock dividends ratio is getting higher. How does listed company make decisions on stock dividends plan？ We explore the way of catering in manager＇s decision - making from internal and external angles. We conclude that ： （ 1 ） From the internal, manager chooses own company＇s nominal price as the frame of reference in decision - making. Nominal price positively affects manager＇s intention of giving stock dividends and actual stock dividends ratio, which means that manager caters investor＇s nominal price illusion. （2） From the external, manager chooses other companies＇ stock dividends ratio as the frame of reference in decision - making. Peers＇ average ratio positively affects manager＇s intention of giving stock dividends and actual stock dividends ratio, which means that manager caters investor＇s reference point effect. （3） Nominal price and peers＇ ratio both positively affect manager＇s intention of giving stock dividends and actual stock dividends ratio. And, there exists substitution effect between these two frames of reference. These results imply that, to optimize the utility of decision, manager takes internal and external frame of reference into account simultaneously and has the incentive of dual catering. This paper expands the catering theory and provides new evidence for reference point theory. This paper fully reveals the mechanism of listed company＇s decision - making on stock dividends and has important regulation implication.