期刊文献+

坚决对行政性垄断说“不”——清理整顿“新居配”政策执法效果评估

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摘要 "新居配"政策是典型的行政性垄断行为。为消除供配电市场实施"新居配"对市场竞争的不良影响,反垄断执法部门对相关政策进行了清理整顿。对执法效果的定量评估结果显示,"新居配"政策导致相关省市的供配电设施安装价格较政策出台前上涨了18.62%,清理整顿后相关价格下降了18.83%。通过清理整顿"新居配"政策,有效降低企业成本达53亿元以上,有力地支持了房地产业降成本和供给侧结构性改革工作。
出处 《中国价格监管与反垄断》 2018年第6期26-28,共3页 Price Supervision and Anti-Monopoly in China
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