基于博弈实验的上级政府干预对征地交易成本影响分析

Effects of the Upper-level Governments' Intervention on Land Acquisition Transaction Costs:An Analysis based on the Game Experiment

研究目的:揭示标准控制、信息公开、事后惩罚等上级政府干预手段对农民—地方政府征地博弈及交易成本的影响,为科学设计征地制度提供参考。研究方法:博弈实验、比较分析。研究结果:(1)强势政府模式下,农民违建、政府强征、农民维权行为的发生率分别为60.8%、42.3%和39.2%,交易成本约相当于土地总价值的15.7%,土地增值收益的17.4%;(2)单一提高征地补偿标准或内部的地方政府最低补偿报价、单一加大对地方政府强制征地行为的事后惩罚将显著增加征地交易成本;(3)将农民与政府价格谈判空间控制在较小区间可以减少交易成本;(4)要求地方政府事前了解农民补偿意愿有利于降低交易成本。研究结论:从减少征地冲突、降低交易成本出发,不能单方面"声援"农民或对地方政府征地行为实施高压;制度设计应着眼于提高征地信息透明化,增进不同主体对土地增值收益公平分配的共识。

The purpose of this study is to reveal the effects of standard control,information disclosure,post punishment and other intervention measures from the upper-level governments on land acquisition game and its transaction costs between farmers and local governments.Methods employed include game experiment and comparative analysis.The results show that：1）in the strong government mode,illegal construction actions of farmers,compulsory land acquisition actions of local governments and safeguard interest actions of farmers were respectively observed in 60.8 percent,42.3 percent and 39.2 percent of all experiments.Land acquisition transaction cost took up 15.7 percent of the land value or 17.4 percent of land value-added.2）Simply raising the state＇s public compensation standard or internal compensation standard,or simply increasing the probability of post punishment for local governments＇ compulsory land acquisition without other supporting measures would add more transaction costs to land acquisition.3）Narrowing the price negotiation space between farmers and local governments could reduce transaction costs.4）Local governments＇ efforts to understand farmers compensation willingness could help to reduce transaction costs.In conclusion,that simply expressing support to farmers＇ safeguard interest actions or putting pressure on local governments are barely helpful to control the land acquisition conflicts and to reduce transaction costs.The policy design should focus on improving information transparency and consensus about the distribution of land incremental value among different stakeholders.