集体禀赋异质性与小型农田水利公共物品参与式供给

Endowment Heterogeneity and Participatory Supply of Public Small Water Conservancy

本文基于期望效用理论建立了理论模型,用陕西、内蒙古、宁夏、河南、山东五省的1582个农户微观数据,以小型农田水利设施为例,对集体禀赋异质性与农户参与供给程度之间的作用机制进行了理论分析,并就理论假设进行了实证检验。研究表明,集体内部的禀赋异质性对农户小型农田水利公共物品参与式供给具有显著的正向影响;农户的风险偏好削弱了其对禀赋异质性的敏感程度,对农户参与供给程度具有显著的负向调节效应;集体禀赋异质性削弱了农户的＂搭便车＂程度,对农户参与供给程度具有显著的正向调节效应;集体禀赋异质性的分布结构亦对农户小型农田水利供给参与程度具有影响,＂高禀赋水平农户组内异质性与集体禀赋异质性之比＂通过正向影响灌溉系统中的＂精英俘获＂强度进而对农户参与供给的程度具有显著的负向中介效应。

Based on the micro-evidence of 1582 farmers from Shanxi,Henan,Shandong provinces and Ningxia,Inner Mongolia autonomous regions,this paper explores the impact of collective＂endowments heterogeneity＂on farmer participation of community-driven farmland water conservancy.We construct an analytical framework by using the theory of expected utility and carry on empirical tests to the proposition of theoretical analysis.First,it was found that collective endowments heterogeneity enhanced the degree of farmer participation.Second,farmers’risk appetite obviously hedged the impact of collective endowments heterogeneity.Third,endowments heterogeneity among community restrained＂Free Rider＂level.Fourth,the distribution structure of collective endowment heterogeneity also has an impact,endowments heterogeneity among elite groups had an indirect negative impact through the＂Elite Capture＂ mechanism.