基于第三方检测机构的食品安全共治演化博弈分析

Evolutionary Game Analysis of Food Safety Co-governance Based on Third Party Testing Institution

食品安全监管问题的演化过程,本质上是利益主体博弈的过程。将第三方检测机构纳入分析框架,采用演化博弈模型分析食品利益主体之间的博弈选择进化稳定策略的条件与关键影响要素。通过与一元主体现实情境下政府模式监管的对比分析,揭示相关主体的策略选择行为与稳定状态。研究结果表明:在食品安全监管博弈过程中,利益机制运行博弈矩阵的相互作用呈现出不同的利益博弈演化策略。食品企业主要利用柠檬市场信息不对称造成的信息交易成本差别提升自身的利润效能;政府监管部门通过完善奖励惩罚机制提高食品的安全监管效能;食品第三方检测机构主要整合企业部门中存在的自愿监督机制,基于承担社会成本的新思路,达到政府—企业—第三方检测机构的演化稳定均衡,从而实现食品安全的社会共治。

The evolution process of food safety supervision problems was essentially the process of game of interest subjects. The third party inspection agencies should be brought into the analysis framework. The evolutionary game model was used to analyze the conditions and key influencing factors of the evolutionary stability strategy between the food production enterprises and the third party testing institutions. Through the comparison and analysis of the government mode regulation under the realistic situation of the united subject,the strategy selection behavior and stable state of the relevant subjects were revealed. The results showed that in the game of food safety supervision,the game matrix interaction of interest mechanism played a different strategy of evolution of interest. Food production enterprises used the information asymmetry of lemon market information to improve the profit efficiency of information transaction costs.Government regulators improved the effectiveness of food safety supervision through perfecting reward and punishment mechanism. Third party food testing institutions that existed in the integration of the corporate sector integrates the voluntary supervision mechanism. The institutions bore the new ideas achieving evolutionary stable equilibrium（ ESS） of social costs,so as to realize the social work of food safety.