客户集中度、分析师跟进与会计信息可比性

Customer Concentration, Analyst Following and Accounting Information Comparability

基于2009--2015年我国A股上市公司公开披露的客户数据，研究了上市公司客户集中度对会计信息可比性的影响。研究发现，客户集中度越高，企业面临的经营风险和经营压力就越大，企业为留住大客户利用信息不对称优势进行选择性信息披露的动机也就越强烈，故会计信息的可比性会降低，即客户集中度与会计信息可比性显著负相关。进一步的研究显示，分析师跟进作为一种外部治理机制，能够有效抑制客户集中度与会计信息可比性之间的负相关关系。

This paper studies the relationship between customer concentration and accounting information comparability based on the disclosed customer data of A-share listed companies from 2009 to 2015. We find a significantly negative correlation between cus- tomer concentration and accounting information comparability. The results indicate that higher degree of customer concentration results with higher business risks and operating pressure, which causing a strong incentive to selectively disclose information on the purpose of retaining key customers. We also find that, as an effective external governance＇ mechanism, analyst following can effectively inhibit the negative correlation between customer concentration and accounting information comparability.